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Abstract 
The principles specific to the implementation of EU law have as characteristic that they mark 
the specificity of EU law in relation to other legal orders, from national or international point of view. 
These  principles include  the  principle  of  conferral, with  multiple  consequences  on  the  entire  EU 
system, but also the principle of subsidiarity, proportionality or of sincere cooperation. 
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1. The principle of conferral
1 
Under the provisions of the Treaties, each institution shall act within the limits of 
prerogatives conferred on it by these Treaties.      
The principle of conferral can be understood as a transfer into European Union law, of 
the specialty principle of international organizations. This stems from the fact that, like all 
international organizations, the European Union is an entity established by the Member States 
and does not share with them, the quality of original subject of international law. 
Under Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union, “the demarcation of the Union’s 
competences is governed by the principle of conferral”. “Under the principle of conferral, the 
Union can only act within the limits of the competences conferred on it by the Member States 
in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out in those Treaties”. Competences not conferred 
upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States”
2.   
Regarding the importance of the principle of conferral, it is determined by the types of 
competences  covered  in  the  EU  treaties.  In  this  respect,  the  nature  and  characteristics  of 
competences  will  influence  the  process  of  their  conferral.  Thus,  we  can  distinguish  two 
situations. In the first case, EU competences do not replace state competences. They remain, 
but  will  be  framed  by  rules  of  law  originating  in  the  EU.  In  this  situation,  the  Union’s 
institutions  have  the  task  to  exercise  a  double  action:  on  the  one  hand,  to  prescribe  in 
accordance with Treaties, rules detailing and customizing the limitations set out by them and 
on the other hand, to ensure compliance with those limitations by Member States.  In the 
second case, the Union’s competences were intended to replace state competences. In this 
situation, the EU institutions have legislative powers greater than those of the Member States 
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1 Legal basis:   
- Statement no. 24: The Union is not authorized „in any way to legislate or to act beyond the competences conferred upon it 
by the Member States in the Treaties”.  
- Article 5 TEU paragraphs (1) and (2): „(1) The demarcation of the Union’s competences is governed by the principle of 
conferral.  The  exercise  of  these  competences  is  governed  by  the  principles  of  subsidiarity  and  proportionality. 
(2) Under the principle of conferral, the Union can act only within the limits of the competences conferred on it by the 
Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the 
Treaties remain with the Member States”. 
2 For details, see Augustin Fuerea, „EU legal personality and areas of competence according to the Treaty of Lisbon”, ESIJ 
no. 1/2010 („Lex ET Scientia International Journal”). Augustin FUEREA  289 
 
due to the Union dimension of actions, accounting in this way, the task to enact common rules 
in the implementation and enforcement of which, the Member States acquire the quality of 
Community authorities (such a situation is encountered for example in joint policies).   
Therefore, under this principle, the EU institutions carry out only those tasks that are 
specifically  set  out.  At  this  level,  the  fulfillment  of  implicit,  deducted  responsibilities 
is not allowed.  
The reason behind this principle is rooted precisely in matters pertaining to the rigor 
shown in the plan of action, but also to the liability
3 of institutions to whether or not fulfill the 
tasks / competences. 
2. The principle of subsidiarity
4 
The  principle  of  subsidiarity  was  introduced  into  the  legal  order  of  the  European 
Union for the first time, by the Single European Act in 1986, and was firmly established in 
Article 3B of the Treaty of Maastricht. Until the emergence of these two conventional texts, 
the principle was, implicitly, present in the founding Treaties, even before ever being in the 
case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. 
Under  Article  5,  paragraph  (4)  TEU,  actions  at  EU  level  will  not  exceed  what  is 
necessary in order to achieve the objectives set out in the Treaties. This means in fact that 
whatever it can be done at national level by Member States, it should not be done jointly at 
EU level; however, if this is not possible, collective intervention is required. The competence 
of common law belongs, therefore, to states. More specifically, it is an acceptance from states 
to limit their competences in order to grant more competences to the Union. Therefore, the 
national competence is the rule, and the competence of the European Union is the exception. 
The doctrine states: “the principle of subsidiarity is a principle governing competences in the 
Union, and not a principle under which competences are granted”
5. 
The principle of subsidiarity involves the following two aspects: 
 - the first aspect considers the situation in which the Union is competent to work in 
the areas and to the extent of objectives assigned to it expressly and obviously, being an 
exclusive competence. In fact, in this case, the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity 
(for  example,  in  the  areas  of  agricultural,  transport,  competition  policies  or  common 
commercial policies) cannot even be brought into question; 
 - the second aspect relates to the case where we are in the presence of competing 
competences, i.e. in areas which do not belong to the Union’s exclusive competences ( for 
example,  areas  of  social  policy,  health  and  consumer  or  environmental  protection),  and 
Member States cannot, because of the dimension and effects of that action, to attain their 
objectives. In this situation, the Union will only intervene in the cases where these objectives 
can be better attained at its level than at the level of Member States. 
                                                 
3 For details regarding „the liability”, see Elena Emilia Ştefan, “Răspunderea juridică. Privire specială asupra răspunderii în 
Dreptul administrativ”, “Pro Universitaria” Publishing House, Bucharest, 2013, pp. 40-49. 
4 Legal basis:   
- Article 5 paragraph (3): „Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action can not be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States at central level or at regional and local level, but the dimension and effects of the proposed action, can be better 
achieved at Union level.   
Institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of subsidiarity in accordance with the Protocol on the application of 
subsidiarity  and  proportionality.  The  national  Parliaments  ensure  the  compliance  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  in 
accordance with the procedure set out in that Protocol”.   
- Protocol (No. 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.   
5 Guy Isaac, Marc Blanquet, „Droit g￩n￩ral  de l'Union Europ￩enne”, 10e ￩dition, Dalloz , 2012 , p. 91 . 290    Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Public Law 
 
Thus, considering the two aspects above mentioned, it is obvious that the principle of 
subsidiarity applies only in the case of shared, competing competences, and not in the case of 
exclusive competences of the European Union. 
3. The principle of proportionality
6 
The  principle  of  proportionality  has  been  jurisprudentially  established,  being 
applicable, initially, in the matter of economic operators’ protection against damage that could 
result from the application of Community law. Subsequently, it was codified by the Treaty of 
Maastricht,  as  it  follows:  “the  Community  action  shall  not  exceed  what  is  necessary  to 
achieve the objectives of this Treaty”
7. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
content of the principle becomes much more accurate, in the sense that “the Union’s action, in 
content  and  form,  shall  not  exceed  what  is  necessary  to  achieve  the  objectives  of  the 
Treaties”. 
Unlike  subsidiarity,  which  “aims  at  determining  if  a  competence  should  be 
exercised”
8, proportionality occurs “once the decision to exercise a competence was taken, in 
order to determine the extent of the law”
9. The principle of proportionality has been designed 
to  avoid  excessive  regulatory  activities  of  the  Union  and  to  find  other  solutions  than 
legislative in order for the Union to achieve its objectives.  
More precisely, proportionality means that, if in the application of a competence, the 
Union has to choose between several modes of action, it must retain that mode which leaves 
states, individuals and businesses, the greatest freedom. To this end, the Union must consider 
whether legislative intervention is urgently needed or other means could also be used, such as 
reciprocity, recommendation, financial support, encouraging cooperation between states or 
accession to an international convention. The principle of proportionality implies that, if it 
proves that it is more than necessary to adopt a rule in the European Union, its content should 
not be an excess of regulation, in the sense that it is preferable to resort to the adoption of a 
directive rather than to a regulation
10. In this respect, there are also the provisions of Article 
296 TFEU, namely: “if Treaties do not specify the type of act to be adopted, the institutions 
shall  select  it, from  case to  case, in  compliance with  applicable procedures  and with  the 
principle of proportionality”.  
In  turn,  the  Court  of  Justice  stated  in  its  ruling
11, in  the  Queen  case
12, that the 
“principle of proportionality requires that the acts of the [ European Union’s] institutions do 
not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the legitimate 
objectives pursued by the regulation in question, in the sense that when there is the possibility 
to choose between several appropriate measures, it must be resorted to the least onerous, and 
that the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued”
13. In this 
respect,  the  academic  literature
14  identifies three dimensions, specific to the principle of 
proportionality, namely: adequacy, necessity and non-disproportionality.     
                                                 
6 Legal basis: 
- Article 5 para. (4) TEU: „Under the principle of proportionality, the Union’s action, in content and form, shall not exceed 
what is necessary to attain the objectives of the Treaties. Institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of proportionality 
in accordance with the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality”. 
- Protocol (no. 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
7 Article 5 para. (3). 
8 Jean Paul Jacqu￩, „Droit institutionnel de l’Union europ￩enne”, 7
e ￩dition, Dalloz, 2012, p. 183 
9 Idem. 
10 Guy Isaac, Marc Blanquet, op. cit., p. 100. 
11 ECJ Ruling, 5 Mai 1998. 
12 C-157/96. 
13 Section 60 from the ruling. 
14 Guy Isaac, Marc Blanquet, op. cit., p. 100. Augustin FUEREA  291 
 
Therefore,  according  to  the  European  Commission
15,  “proportionality  is  a  guiding 
principle for defining how the Union should exercise its competences, both exclusive and 
shared - which should be the form and nature of EU action? According to the TEU, the 
content and form of the Union’s action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives  of  the  Treaties.  Any  decision  should  favour  the  least  restrictive  option  in  this 
regard”
16. 
4. Common aspects of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality
17 
Under Article 1 of Protocol no. (2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity 
and  proportionality,  each  EU  institution  shall,  at  all  times,  provide  compliance  with  the 
principle  of  subsidiarity.  In  this  regard,  the  Protocol  establishes  a  control  mechanism  for 
compliance with this principle. Thus, before proposing legislative acts
18, the Commission, 
under Article 2 of the Protocol, must proceed to extensive consultations involving the regional 
and local dimension of actions envisaged. From the necessit y of consultation, it can be 
derogated only in case of emergency, but in this case, the Commission must explain its 
decision in its proposal. Further, the Protocol provides that
19 both the European Parliament 
and the Commission are required to submit to national parliaments, their draft legislative acts, 
as well as their amended drafts, at the same time as to the Council. The Council, in turn, is 
required to submit to national parliaments, the draft legislative acts originating from a group 
of  Member  States,   the  Court  of  Justice,  the  European  Central  Bank  or  the  European 
Investment Bank, as well as the amended drafts. 
In fact, the draft legislative acts must be grounded in terms of compliance with the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. In this se nse, Article 5 specifies that any draft 
legislative act must contain a detailed statement allowing the assessment of the compliance 
with the principle of subsidiarity. This statement includes “elements allowing the assessment 
of  the  financial  impact  of  the  draft  in  question  and,  in  the  case  of  a  directive,  of  its 
implications on the rules to be implemented by Member States, including on the regional 
legislation, as appropriate. The reasons that lead to the conclusion that a Union objective can 
be better achieved at Union level shall be substantiated by qualitative and, wherever possible, 
quantitative indicators. The draft legislative acts must consider the need to proceed so that any 
burden, whether financial or administrative, falling upon the Union, national governments, 
regional  or  local  authorities,  economic  operators  and  citizens,  to  be  minimized  and 
proportionate to the aim pursued”
20. 
Within  eight  weeks from  the transmission of the draft legislative act,  the national 
parliaments  can  send  to  the  President  of  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council  and  the 
Commission, a reasoned opinion stating why they consider that the draft in question does not 
comply with the principle of subsidiarity
21. Once the opinion received, the President of the 
Council  will  transmit   it  further  to  the  governments  of  states  which  initiated  the  draft 
                                                 
15 European Commission Report on subsidiarity and proportionality (18th report “Better Regulation” for 2010), COM (2011) 
344 final, Brussels, 10.06.2011 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ / LexUriServ.do? uri = COM: 2011:0344: FIN: RO: 
PDF).  
16 Ibid, p. 2. 
17 For details, see Roxana-Mariana Popescu, „Introducere în dreptul Uniunii Europene”, „Universul Juridic” Publishing 
House,  Bucharest,  2011,  pp.  84-95  and  Mihaela-Augustina  Dumitraşcu,  „Dreptul  Uniunii  Europene  şi  specificitatea 
acestuia”, „Universul Juridic”  Publishing House, Bucharest, 2012, pp. 66-72.  
18 Under Art. 3, „In the meaning of this Protocol, “draft legislative act” mean proposals of the Commission, initiatives from a 
group of Member States, the European Parliament’s initiatives, requests from the Court of Justice, the European Central 
Bank's recommendations and requests of the European Investment Bank on the adoption of a legislative act”. 
19 Article 4. 
20 Article 5 of the Protocol. 
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legislative  act,  respectively  to  the  Court  of  Justice,  the  European  Central  Bank  or  the 
European Investment Bank, if one of these institutions is the originator of the draft legislative 
act. 
In  the  case  where  the  reasoned  opinions  on  non-compliance  of  a  draft  with  the 
principle  of  subsidiarity  represent  at  least  one  third  of  all  the  votes  allocated  to  national 
parliaments, or a quarter for a draft referring to the area of freedom, security and justice, the 
draft must be reviewed. Following this review, the Commission or, where appropriate, the 
group of Member States, the European Court of Justice , the European Central Bank or the 
European Investment Bank , if the draft legislative act is issued by them, can decide whether 
to maintain the draft, to amend it or to withdraw it. No matter what the solution is, it must, 
however, be reasoned. 
Article 7 of the Protocol regulates, including the situation in which the opinion is 
offered in the ordinary legislative procedure. In this case, the opinions reasoned on the non-
compliance of a draft legislative act with the principle of subsidiarity represent at least a 
simple majority of the votes allocated to national parliaments, the draft must be reviewed. 
Following such review, the Commission can decide to maintain the proposal, to amend it or 
withdraw it. If it chooses to maintain the proposal, the Commission must justify, in a reasoned 
opinion, why it considers that the proposal complies with the principle of subsidiarity. This 
reasoned opinion, as well as the reasoned opinions of national parliaments must be submitted 
to the Council and the European Parliament in order to be taken into consideration in the 
procedure
22:   
(a) before concluding the first reading, the European Parliament and the Council shall 
examine if the legislative proposal is compatible with the principle of subsidiarity, taking 
particularly  into  account  the reasons  expressed  and  shared  by  the majority  of national 
parliaments, as well as the Commission’s reasoned opinion;    
(b) if, by a majority of 55 % of the members of the Council or a majority of the votes 
cast in the European Parliament, the Council and Parliament ( as legislative institutions ) 
consider that the legislative proposal is not compatible with the principle of subsidiarity, it 
will not be further examined. 
In  the  case  where  a  Member  State  or  a  Member  State  on  behalf  of  its  national 
parliament notices that a legal act of the Union was adopted without complying with the 
principle of subsidiarity, it can attack that act, through an action for annulment, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union being the one that has the competence to rule on such actions. 
Such actions can be also formulated by the Committee of the Regions against legislative acts 
for the adoption of which the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union provides that it 
must be consulted23. 
According to the European Commission
24, “the control and monitoring of subsidiarity 
issues  have  played  an  important  role  in  the  agenda  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Committee of the Regions which adapted their internal procedures to more effectively analyze 
the impact and added value of the work performed”
25. 
                                                 
22 Under Article 7, paragraph (3) of the Protocol. 
23 Article 8, paragraph (2) of the Protocol. 
24 The annual Report of the European Commission for 2012 , regarding subsidiarity and proportionality COM(2013) 566 
final, 30.7.2013  
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0566:FIN:RO:PDF). 
25 Ibid, p. 11. Augustin FUEREA  293 
 
5. The principle of sincere cooperation 
Under the principle of sincere cooperation, “Member States are obliged to implement 
EU law, thereby contributing to the mission of the Union, and to refrain from any action that 
could jeopardize the achievement of the EU objectives”
26. 
Under Article 4 TEU, “according to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union 
and the Member States shall respect and assist each other in carrying out missions arising out 
of  the  Treaties.  Member  States  shall  take  any  general  or  particular  action  to  ensure  the 
fulfillment of obligations under the Treaties or resulting from the acts of EU institutions. 
Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s mission and refrain from any 
measure detrimental to the achievement of its objectives”. In this way, three obligations are 
established  in  the  task  of  Member  States
27:  two  positive  (the  adoption  of  measures  to 
implement EU law and facilitate the exercise of the Union’s mission) and one negative - not 
to take any action that would jeopardize the objectives of the Union. 
In the Union, under the principle of sincere cooperation, the Member States are invited 
to support the Union’s actions and not to hinder its proper functioning, for instance
28 by 
punishing  infringements  of  EU  law,  as  strictly  as  infringements  of  national  law  or  by 
cooperating with the Commission in procedures linked to the monitoring of compliance with 
EU law, e.g. by sending the documents required in accordance with the rules etc. 
The sincere cooperation is a principle that the Treaty on European Union requires to 
be complied with by the EU institutions, too. Thus, according to Article 13 paragraph (2), the 
last sentence is “institutions shall cooperate with each other fairly”. 
The  inter-institutional  collaboration  principle  is  found  in  Article  249  TFEU  “that 
stipulates that the Council and the Commission must start mutual consultation and agree on 
the modalities of collaboration. Inter-institutional cooperation is organized in various ways, 
including: exchanges of letters between the Council and the Commission; inter-institutional 
agreements, joint declarations of the three institutions”
29 etc. 
The principle has been often invoked by the Court of Justice in Luxembourg in various 
rulings over time. Thus, in 1983, the Court reminded in the ruling from the case Luxembourg 
v./ the European Parliament
30, that “when provisional decisions are taken, governments of the 
Member States must, under the rule which requires states and Community institutions, mutual 
obligations of sincere cooperation, rule inspired, especially from Article 5 TEC, consider that 
these decisions do not affect the proper functioning “
31of the Union's institutions. In 1986, in 
the  ruling  in  case  Greece  v.  /  the  Council
32,  the  Court  maintains  its  position,  extending 
however, the sincere cooperation also to relations between the Union’s institutions, saying 
that  in  the  dialogue  between  the  Union’s  institutions,  “must  prevail  the  same  mutual 
obligations of sincere cooperation ( ... ) that govern also the relations between Member States 
and Community institutions”
33. The Court goes back to the principle of cooperation, in 1990 
                                                 
26 Fran￧ois-Xavier Priollaud, David Siritzky, „Le Trait￩ de Lisbonne. Texte et commentaire article par article des nouveaux 
trait￩s europ￩ens (TUE-TFUE)”, La documentation Fran￧aise, Paris, 2008, pp. 39-40. 
27 According to Rapport de Monsieur Etienne Goethals presented during „R￩union constitutive du comit￩sur l’environnement 
del’AHJUCAF.  Ecole  R￩gionale  Sup￩rieure  de  la  Magistrature  de  l’OHADA  Porto-Novo  (B￩nin)  –  Actes”, 
http://www.ahjucaf.org/IMG/pdf/pdf_Actes_Porto-Novo.pdf. 
28 According to: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/decisionmaking_process/l10125_ro.htm 
29 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/decisionmaking_process/l10125_ro.htm 
30 10 February 1983, case 230/81 
(http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=61981CJ0230&lang1=ro&lang2=FR&type=NOT&ancre=). 
31 Section 37 from the ruling. 
32 27 September 1988, case 204/86 
(http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=61986CJ0204&lang1=ro&lang2=FR&type=NOT&ancre=). 
33 Section 16 from the ruling. 294    Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Public Law 
 
when it specified, in the ordinance ruled in the case Zwarveld
34, that “in this community of 
law,  relations  between  Member  States  and  Community  institutions  are  governed,  under 
Article  5  TEC35,  by  the  principle  of  sincere  cooperation.  The  principle  obliges  not  only 
Member States to take all measures necessary to ensure the strength and effectiveness of 
Community law, including, when needed, even of criminal nature, but requires equally to 
Community institutions, mutual obligations of sincere cooperation with Member States”36. 
At  a  careful  analysis  of  references  made  by  the  Court  to  the  principle  of  sincere 
cooperation,  we  can  see  that,  according  to  the  Luxembourg  Court,  this  principle  has  the 
following features37: it is a guiding principle of relations between Member States and EU 
institutions; it is a bilateral principle and it is a principle that applies not only to relations 
between Member States and EU institutions, but also to relations between EU institutions”. 
6. Conclusions 
The principles of the European Union are stemming from specific principles of public 
international law, on the one hand, and from the principles contained in the legal systems of 
Member States,  on the  other hand. To become principles of  EU law,  these categories of 
principles are “communitarised”
38, as they are passed through the “filter of EU objectives, so 
sometimes, they may stand some limitations in order to comply with EU law”
39.   
As we have seen, the European Union Treaties contain only general references to the 
principles specific to the implementation of EU law because the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union was, in fact, the real developer of these principles. 
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